Getting That Model T Back On The Road: Thomas Flint On Incarnation And Mereology by Hasker, William
Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian 
Philosophers 
Volume 32 Issue 2 Article 4 
4-1-2015 
Getting That Model T Back On The Road: Thomas Flint On 
Incarnation And Mereology 
William Hasker 
Follow this and additional works at: https://place.asburyseminary.edu/faithandphilosophy 
Recommended Citation 
Hasker, William (2015) "Getting That Model T Back On The Road: Thomas Flint On Incarnation And 
Mereology," Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian Philosophers: Vol. 32 : Iss. 2 , Article 
4. 
Available at: https://place.asburyseminary.edu/faithandphilosophy/vol32/iss2/4 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at ePLACE: preserving, learning, and creative 
exchange. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian 
Philosophers by an authorized editor of ePLACE: preserving, learning, and creative exchange. 
GETTING THAT MODEL T BACK 
O N THE ROAD: THOMAS FLINT O N 
INCARNATION A N D MEREOLOGY 
Wil l i am Hasker 
Thomas Flint claims that an argument of his seriously damages "Model T," a 
mereological model of the incarnation. I contend that the argument fails, and 
that Model T remains viable. 
In a recent essay Thomas Flint has criticized mereological models of the 
incarnation—models in which the relationships between the eternal d i -
vine person, the Son of God, and the Son's human and divine natures, are 
interpreted in terms of part-whole relations. 1 In particular, he criticizes 
"Model T"; 2 he then goes on to consider another mereological model, 
M o d e l A , as well as several non-mereological models. I take no position 
here on those other models, but I w i l l argue that M o d e l T is roadworthy as 
it stands. 
According to Mode l T, Flint tells us, "the Son or Word of G o d (whom 
I' l l label W) takes on C H N [Christ's human nature] as a part. This assump-
tion results in a Son who combines both his original, divine substance (D) 
and his created human nature ( C H N ) " (71). But how are we to under-
stand D? Not wanting to plunge into the difficulties of trinitarian theology, 
Flint proposes that "we view D as standing for the divine substance plus 
whatever properties or characteristics (e.g., being generated by the Father) 
distinguish the Son f rom the other two divine persons" (71). Henceforth, 
he w i l l refer to D as the-divine-substance-plus-whatever. Since the incarna¬
tion is a contingent event, we can contrast a wor ld Y, in which incarnation 
occurs, wi th a wor ld N , in which there is no incarnation. Given this min¬
imal machinery, Flint develops an argument (hereafter, Argument F), to 
show that Mode l T is untenable. Flint presents his argument as a special 
case of "a standard objection to mereological increase, sometimes called 
the growing argument, that is difficult to handle for mundane cases of 
1 Thomas P. Flint, "Should Concretists Part Wi th Mereological Models of the Incarnation?" 
in The Metaphysics of the Incarnation, ed. A n n a Marmodoro and Jonathan H i l l (Oxford: Oxford 
Universi ty Press, 2011), 67-86. Page references in the text are to this essay. 
2So-called f rom Thomas Aquinas , who embraced the view, albeit wi th some hesitancy. 
There is also, it develops, an allusion to Henry Ford. 
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substances gaining parts and, as I see it, even harder to handle in the case 
of Mode l T" (72).3 The argument proceeds as follows: 
(1) W in Y = W in N . 
This seems correct, because the same Son or Word exists in both of these 
possible worlds. But we can also assert 
(2) W in N = D in N . 
This is so because "In worlds such as N . . . there are no parts to compose 
the Son other than the divine-substance-plus-whatever. In such worlds, 
then, it seems that the Son must be simply identical wi th D " (73). Further¬
more, 
(3) D in N = D in Y. 
D is itself a necessary being; it exists whether or not the Son becomes 
incarnate. But now we can infer 
(4) W in Y = D in Y. 
"But," says Flint, "(4) is clearly lethal to Mode l T. For that model insists 
that the incarnate Son is a composite being, one who is not identical wi th 
D , but rather has D as a proper part" (73). 
If Mode l T is to be saved, then, it seems that at least one of the premises 
of Argument F must be discredited. (Another possibility, mentioned but 
not favored by Flint, would be to adopt relative identity theory and insist 
that identity, properly relativized, is not transitive.) Flint surveys a number 
of possible ways of rejecting one of the premises, ways that parallel typical 
responses to the "growing argument," but concludes that none of them is 
very attractive. He concludes that "we have some reason to doubt Mode l 
T's claim to offer us an accurate picture of what takes place in the incarna¬
tion. If Mode l T has survived the challenge posed by our puzzle at all, it's 
more as a road-weary clunker than as the sleek, smooth-running model it 
originally appeared to be" (79). 
Since Argument F is a special case of the growing argument, it comes as 
no surprise that formally identical arguments can be mounted to discredit 
the possibility that parts can be added to substances other than the divine 
Word. Here is one such argument, Argument F*: A s it happens, the au¬
tomobile I now drive does not have an external radio antenna; incoming 
programs are received through wires embedded in the car's rear window. 
This works well enough most of the time, but it has sometimes occurred 
to me that in situations of marginal reception I might do better with an 
external antenna in addition to the one that is built-in. N o doubt there is 
another possible wor ld in which I drive the same car but have added such 
an external antenna. According to Mode l T*, in that wor ld "my automobile 
Woofer (which I w i l l label W*) takes on the additional antenna (A*) as a 
3 For more on the growing argument, see Eric Olson, "The Paradox of Increase," The 
Monist 89 (2006), 390^17. 
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part. This assumption results in a Woofer which combines both its original 
automotive substance (D*) and its new antenna (A*)." We w i l l take D * to 
be whatever originally combined to make Woofer the automobile that it 
is—say, a body and an engine. Finally, let Y* be a wor ld in which Woofer 
acquires the additional antenna, and N * be a wor ld i n which it does not. 
A n d now we are ready for Argument F*: 
(1*) W* in Y * = W* in N * 
(2*) W* in N * = D* i n N * 
This is so because "In worlds such as N * . . . there are no parts to compose 
Woofer other than D*. In such worlds, then, it seems that Woofer must be 
simply identical wi th D*." 
(3*) D* in N * = D* in Y * 
A n d now we can infer 
(4*) W* in Y * = D* in Y*. 
"But," says Flint*, "(4*) is clearly lethal to Mode l T*. For that model insists 
that in Y * Woofer is a composite being, one which is not identical wi th D*, 
but rather has D* as a proper part." If Argument F* is successful, then, 
Mode l T* is logically impossible. However, it seems extremely plausible 
that Mode l T* is possible, and if so, something must be wrong wi th the 
argument. 
The fact that an argument formally identical wi th Argument F can be 
used to demonstrate the impossibility of a situation that certainly seems 
to be possible strongly suggests that there is something wrong wi th Argu¬
ment F itself. This does not, however, tell us what in particular is wrong 
with that argument. To get at that, let's begin by asking once more, just 
what is the problem about the argument's conclusion, (4)?4 It turns out 
that this depends on how we understand D , the Son's original divine 
substance. The question that needs to be answered is this: Is D such that 
additional parts can be added to it, parts that then become part of D itself? If we 
assume an affirmative answer to this question, then plausibly D is simply 
identical wi th W, the Son or Word of God . (Isn't that what we should 
expect, if we add to the divine substance whatever is distinctive of the 
Second Person of the Trinity?) But in that case, the conclusion (4) presents 
no difficulty; it simply asserts that the Son is identical wi th himself, which 
is hardly a surprise. To be sure, i n Y the Son has assumed an additional 
part, namely C H N . But in Y so has D assumed an additional part; which is 
as it should be, since D just is the Son. O n this reading, then, Argument F 
is sound, all right, but it creates no difficulty for Mode l T. 
This way of understanding D , however, does not seem to be consistent 
wi th Mode l T, as Flint understands it, which "insists that the incarnate 
4I believe that a parallel move can be used to uncover the problems wi th Argument F*, but 
I w i l l not develop that answer here. 
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Son is a composite being, one who is not identical wi th D , but rather has 
D as a proper part" (73). A n d given this, as Flint states, "(4) is clearly le¬
thal to Mode l T" (73). For that model we must, then, assume (unlike the 
first interpretation), that D cannot have another proper part added to it, 
in addition to D itself. D thus understood cannot be identical wi th the 
substance which is the Son; it must rather be something else, something 
which cannot be augmented by the addition of parts. In this case (4) w i l l 
certainly be false, for on this interpretation D, "the-divine-substance-plus-
whatever" cannot possibly be identical wi th the Son, who includes C H N 
as a part in addition to D . 
A t this point, however, premise (2) comes into question. O n the present 
interpretation, D cannot possibly be identical wi th the Son i n any world, 
for the Son has the property of being such that an additional part (namely 
C H N ) can be added to him, a property which by hypothesis is lacking to 
D . So the relationship between D and the Son, while doubtless intimate 
and important, cannot be that of identity. (My own proposal is that the 
divine nature constitutes the Son under certain conditions. But we can't 
go into that here.5) O n this reading, argument F is unsound, and poses no 
threat to Mode l T. 
It should be said here that Flint considers the possibility of rejecting 
premise (2), and in that way avoiding the force of Argument F (see 7^77). 
After discussing several possible ways of doing this, he concludes "It 
seems, then, that none of our purported ways of discrediting (2) is easy 
to swallow. Since I know of no other means of impugning (2), we need to 
conclude, I think, that the advocate of Mode l T may well find it difficult 
to reject (2)" (77). Now, I acknowledge that, if we conclude that the Son 
cannot be identical wi th D in wor ld N (nor, therefore, in any other world), 
we are left wi th the problem of explaining what the relation between the 
Son and D in fact is. A n d this may wel l present difficulties of the sort Flint 
enumerates. We have here something closely analogous to the problem of 
material constitution, and it is highly plausible that any solution to that 
problem w i l l be counterintuitive in one way or another. (Human brains 
just are not hard-wired for modal logic.) I've indicated above my prefer¬
ence for a solution in terms of constitution, but I have not developed or 
defended that solution. But here is the point: For the purposes of the present 
article, I have no need to defend such a solution, nor do I need to answer the other 
objections posed by Flint. M y purpose here is merely to defend Model T 
f rom Flint's Argument F, and for this purpose it is sufficient to show that 
Argument F is unsound. A n d this I have done, by showing that, given 
the other assumptions in play here, premise (2) of Argument F cannot 
possibly be true. W, the divine Son is (according to Mode l T) such that a 
part can be added so as to become part of W. D , the divine-nature-plus-
whatever, is such that no part can be added so as to become a part of D . 
5See my Metaphysics and the Tri-Personal God (Oxford: Oxford Universi ty Press, 2013), 
238-245. 
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Since W and D differ in this modal property, W cannot be identical wi th 
D , i n N or in any other world. This reasoning is rock-solid, and cannot be 
shaken by the objections posed by Flint. 
To be sure, we might attempt to defend the identity i n N of W and D 
by insisting that a person such as the Son cannot have a part added to him. 
But if we were to do that, we would render the argument circular and 
transparently question-begging. 
We can conclude that Argument F fails; interestingly, it can fai l in any of 
three different ways, depending on various assumptions that can be made. 
If D is the substance or person who is the Son, the argument is sound but 
innocuous; it poses no problem for Mode l T. If on the contrary D is such 
that no additional parts can become part of it, premise (2) is false and the 
argument is unsound. If, finally, we rescue premise (2) by insisting that 
the Son cannot add an additional part, the argument becomes circular and 
question-begging. But however this goes, the argument cannot do its job. 
The owner of Mode l T has been sitting nervously in the office of the 
metaphysical garage, waiting for word about the condition of his pride 
and joy. When the mechanic enters f rom the shop area, we can tell f rom his 
expression that the news is good, even before he says, "There doesn't seem 
to be anything wrong with it. F i l l it up wi th gas, and you're good to go." 6 
Huntington University 
6 M y thanks to Joseph Jedwab and Thomas Flint for extremely helpful comments on an 
earlier version of this paper. 
